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CHAPTER 3 
Finance Through Food and Commodity Value 
Chains in a Globalized Economy* 
Johan F.M. Swinnen1 and Miet Maertens2 
1 Introduction 
The growth of value chains and the associated spread of quality standards has trig-
gered a vigorous debate in the development community over their impacts on poor 
producers in developing countries.3 Quality requirements in value chains affect 
farms through several channels. First, ever-more rigorous public quality require-
ments in richer countries are imposed on imports and consequently have an impact 
on producers and traders in exporting nations (Jaffee and Henson, 2005; Unne-
vehr, 2000). Second, global value chains are playing an increasingly important 
role in world food markets and the growth of these marketing channels, which are 
often vertically coordinated, is associated with increasing quality standards (Swin-
nen, 2007). For example, modern retailing companies increasingly dominate mar-
kets in fruits and vegetables, including urban markets in many poorer countries, 
and have begun to set standards for food quality and safety in this sector wherever 
they do business (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Henson et al., 2000). Third, rising 
investment in processing in developing countries also has induced demand for 
higher-value and higher-quality commodities from local producers in order to 
serve the high-end income consumers in the domestic economy or to minimize 
transaction costs in their regional distribution and supply chains (Dries et al., 
2004; Reardon et al., 2003). 
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The development implications and the impact on small farmers has been ac-
tively debated. On the one hand, agriculture in developing countries, and exports 
of agricultural commodities, are seen as a very important potential source of pro-
poor growth. On the other hand, tightening food safety and quality standards, both 
from private and public sources, strongly affects domestic and international trade, 
and value chains (Jaffee and Henson, 2004). Some have argued that they reinforce 
global inequality and poverty as: (1) they introduce new (non-tariff) barriers to 
trade; (2) they exclude small, poorly informed, and weakly capitalized producers 
from participating in these high-quality supply systems; and (3) because large and 
often multinational companies extract all the surplus through their bargaining 
power within the chains (Augier et al., 2005; Reardon and Berdegué, 2002; Unne-
vehr, 2000; Warning and Key, 2002). 
A key concern is that the process of vertical coordination will exclude a large 
share of farms, and in particular small farmers. Three reasons are mentioned for 
this. First, transaction costs favor larger farms in value chains because it is easier 
for companies to contract with a few large farms rather than with numerous small 
ones. Second, when some amount of investment is needed in order to contract 
with companies or to supply high-value produce, small farms are often more con-
strained in their financial means for making necessary investments. Third, small 
farms typically require more assistance from the company per unit of output. The 
concern of the exclusion of small farmers is often voiced and raised in studies on 
the impact of the growth of high value chains, which regularly emphasizes the 
shift to larger, preferred suppliers and the exclusion of small farms (e.g. Reardon 
and Berdegué, 2002). 
However, there is considerable debate and uncertainty about the validity of 
these arguments, and more generally about the welfare implications of high value 
chains (Swinnen, 2007). First, while quality and safety standards indeed make 
production more costly, at the same time they reduce transaction costs in trade, 
both domestic and internationally. In other words, besides barriers, standards can 
also be catalysts for trade (Maertens and Swinnen, 2010). Second, recent empirical 
studies show that smallholder participation in global value chains is much more 
widespread than initially argued and that the situation is actually very diverse, as 
we shall see later in this chapter. Small farmers are dominant participants in mod-
ern value chains in countries and sectors as diverse as domestic horticultural value 
chains in Asia (e.g. China), cotton chains in Central Asia (e.g. Kazakhstan), horti-
cultural exports from Africa (e.g. Madagascar) and various value chains (dairy, 
barley) in Eastern Europe (e.g. Poland). There are also cases where farm structures 
in modern value chains are mixed, for example in vegetable exports from eastern 
Africa (e.g. Senegal); or where large farms dominate, such as in fruit and vegeta-
ble value chains in southern and eastern Africa, and grains and oilseeds in the 
former Soviet Union (e.g. Russia and Kazakhstan). Recent evidence also shows 
that important changes may occur over time within a chain, but the direction is 
equally diverse: small farmer participation declined in some cases (horticultural 
exports in Senegal) and increased in other cases (tea in Sri Lanka). 
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There is less evidence on the third issue, which is the rent distribution within 
these value chains. Empirically, most studies have focused on the exclusion issue 
and very few studies actually measure welfare, income, or poverty. The few stud-
ies that do measure welfare effects find positive effects for poor households in de-
veloping countries that may participate either as smallholder producers or through 
wage employment on larger farming companies (Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; 
Maertens et al., 2011; Minten et al., 2009). What is remarkable is that these strong 
benefits occur in several of these cases despite the fact that smallholders and rural 
workers face monopsonistic processing, trading, and retail companies. 
To understand these welfare effects it is important to realize that the introduc-
tion of higher quality requirements has coincided with the growth of value chain 
finance (VCF) and technology transfer (Dries et al. 2009; Miller and Jones 2010, 
Quiros 2007; Swinnen 2007). Contracts for quality production with local suppliers 
in developing countries not only specify conditions for delivery and production 
processes but also include the provision of inputs, credit, technology, management 
advice, etc. (Minten et al., 2009; World Bank, 2005). The latter are particularly 
important for local suppliers who face important local factor market imperfections 
– another key characteristic. In particular, imperfections in credit and technology 
markets are typically large, which implies major constraints for investments re-
quired for quality upgrading, especially for local firms and households that cannot 
source from international capital markets. However, the enforcement of contracts 
for quality production and value chain finance is difficult in developing countries 
that are often characterized by poorly functioning enforcement institutions. These 
enforcement problems can add significantly to the cost of contracting and may 
prevent actual contracting from taking place and inhibit value chain financing. 
The first part of this chapter discusses the development of value chains and the 
inclusion of small farmers. The second part discusses the development of value-
chain finance within these value chains. 
2 Increased Importance of Value Chains 
The growth of value chains in emerging and developing countries is related to two 
factors: the growth of demand for high-value products in local markets, and in-
creased exports of high-value commodities to high-income countries. 
First, domestic consumption of high-value crops such as fruits and vegetables 
in developing countries increased by 200 percent in 1980–2005, while consump-
tion of cereals stagnated during that period. This growth relates to increasing in-
comes and urbanization, and is reflected in the rapid growth of modern food in-
dustries and retail chains (“supermarkets”) in urban market segments (Reardon et 
al., 2003). Modern retail companies have expanded rapidly throughout the devel-
oping world and have set high standards for food quality and safety (Dolan and 
Humphrey, 2000; Henson et al., 2000). Important factors behind the spread of 
modern food industries have been liberalized investment policies and the associ-
ated inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in developing country food sectors. 
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FDI stocks expanded from less than 10 percent of GDP in the early 1990s in most 
developing and emerging countries to 25 percent in 2005 in Southeast Asia and 
the transition countries, and 30 percent in Africa and Latin America. In the major-
ity of African countries the agri-food sector accounts for a vast share of FDI in-
flows (UNCTAD, 2010). 
Second, high-value food exports – including fruits and vegetables, meat and milk 
products, fish and seafood products – from developing countries increased more 
than 300 percent in the period 1980–2005 and now constitute more than 40 percent 
of total developing country agri-food exports (World Bank, 2008). The growth in 
high-value agricultural export products from developing countries has been much 
faster than the growth in traditional tropical exports such as coffee, cocoa, and tea, 
which decreased in overall importance (Figure 1). For Asia, the shift toward non-
traditional and high-value exports started earlier, but for Africa, Latin America, and 
the Caribbean the decreasing importance of traditional crops and the growth in fruits 

























Fig. 1. Changing structure of developing countries’ agro-food exports, 1985–20054 
Source: Maertens et al. (2009) 
                                                          
4  Tropical products include coffee, cocoa, tea, nuts and spices, textile fibres, sugar, and 
confectionary. Temperate products include cereals, animal feed, and edible oils. High-
value products include fruits, vegetables, fish, seafood, meat, and meat products, milk 
and dairy products. Other products include tobacco and cigarettes, beverages, rubber, 
and other processed food products. 
Developing countries include all low- and middle-income countries in Africa, Cen-
tral-America, South-America and the Caribbean; East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia 
and Central Asia. 
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These non-traditional exports mainly concern products such as fruits, vegetables, 
flowers, fish, and seafood, which are consumed in fresh or processed form and for 
which the value (per weight or per unit) is typically much higher than for more 
bulky primary commodities destined for further processing, such as the typical 
tropical products. In Africa, the exports of fruits and vegetables has increased 
from 1.9 billion U.S. dollars in 1990 to 5.6 billion U.S. dollars in 2007 (FAOSTAT, 
2010). Several African countries, including very poor countries such as Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Senegal, have become important suppliers of fresh fruits 
and vegetables to EU markets. Similarly, several poor Latin American countries 
(Guatemala, Honduras, Bolivia) have successfully increased their exports of fresh 
vegetables to the United States. 
The importance of this shift from traditional to non-traditional export com-
modities is twofold. First, many developing countries have for decades been 
highly dependent on one or just a few export commodities, which has made coun-
tries vulnerable, for example to volatilities and shocks in world market prices. The 
shift toward non-traditional exports implies more diversified export portfolios, 
which reduces these vulnerabilities. Second, non-traditional exports are high-value 
products for which the value per unit or per weight is much higher as compared to 
typical traditional tropical exports such as coffee, tea, and cocoa. This creates op-
portunities for rural income generation and poverty reduction among smallholder 
producers in these countries. 
3 Organization and Structure of Value Chains 
The shift toward high-value agriculture is accompanied by a thorough transforma-
tion of the agri-food sector. This restructuring or “modernization” of the supply 
chain includes: (1) the increasing number and stringency of standards – both pub-
lic and private – for quality and safety; (2) a shift from a fragmented sector to con-
solidation in the chain (mostly at the level of processing, distribution, and/or re-
tail); (3) a shift from spot markets transactions in traditional wholesale markets to 
increasing levels of vertical coordination, including value-chain finance. These 
structural changes have important implications for the participation of small farm-
ers and distribution of the benefits. 
3.1 Increasing Public and Private Standards 
During the past decade, standards, including public regulations as well as private 
corporate standards, have increased sharply, especially for non-traditional export 
products such as fresh fruits, vegetables, and seafood, which are easily perishable. 
Fresh food exports to the European Union, for example, have to satisfy stringent 
public requirements, including marketing standards, labeling requirements, condi-
tions concerning contamination in food, general hygiene rules, and traceability re-
quirements. In addition, private standards, focusing on food quality and safety, or-
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ganic production or fair trade, are increasingly established by large food compa-
nies, supermarkets chains, and NGOs, and play an increasingly important role in 
agro-food trade (Jaffee and Henson, 2005). The demand for higher food standards 
changed the way of doing business along the food chain. 
Public and private food standards have often been claimed to act as barriers for 
developing countries’ food exports, but it is remarkable that many poor countries 
experienced accelerated growth in fresh produce exports to high-income countries 
exactly during a period of sharply increased food quality and safety standards. For 
example, between 1997 and 2006 horticultural exports from Senegal increased 
five-fold, while the number of new sanitary and phytosanitary measures (filed to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) increased six-fold over the same period. 
3.2 Increasing Consolidation in Processing and Retail 
Consolidation is taking place in the food industry, both in high income countries 
and in emerging economies. Most of this process is through mergers and acquisi-
tions, and it applies both to food processing and retail companies. Large food 
companies are also spreading globally, through foreign direct investments. In this 
way they contribute to concentration outside of their home markets. 
In many Eastern European transition countries, the five-firm concentration ratio 
in food retail is already high, above 60 percent in many countries. For example, 
the top five supermarkets in Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland represented respec-
tively 59 percent, 61 percent, and 57 percent of supermarket sales in 2009. In most 
of South America, East Asia (outside China), and southern Africa, the average 
share of supermarkets in food retail went from only 10 to 20 percent in 1990 all 
the way to 50 to 60 percent by the early 2000s (Reardon et al., 2003). Also, food 
processing and exporting has become increasingly consolidated. For example, in 
Senegal the number of firms exporting green beans fell from 27 in 2002 to 14 in 
2008 (Maertens et al., 2011). 
3.3 Vertical Coordination and Value Chain Finance 
The move toward value chains with increasingly stringent standards has led to 
changes in the organization of supply chains. Rather than being based on spot 
market transactions, value chains entail varying levels of vertical coordination at 
different nodes in the chains.5 First, at the production level, contracting and verti-
                                                          
5 A 2005 comparative study by the World Bank on Eastern Europe and Central Asia came 
to the conclusion that such vertical coordination programs were important in transition 
countries for several commodities, and growing (World Bank, 2005; Swinnen, 2006). The 
study concluded that, for example, in the dairy sector, extensive production contracts have 
developed between dairy processors and farms, including the provision of credit, invest-
ment loans, animal feed, extension services, bank loan guarantees, etc. In the sugar sector, 
marketing agreements are widespread, but also more extensive contracts, including also 
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cal coordination has grown strongly in some of the high-value supply chains in 
Latin America, Asia, Europe, and Africa (Swinnen, 2007; World Bank, 2005). 
Part of these vertical coordination initiatives include the provision of, for example, 
finance, transportation, physical inputs, and quality control. However, investment 
loans and bank loan guarantees are also provided in several cases. 
Rising food standards are increasingly associated with a shift toward even more 
extreme levels of vertical coordination in upstream processing and trading. Large 
exporters increasingly engage in fully vertically integrated estate production 
where wage laborers are hired to work on large-scale plantations. 
Second, downstream vertical coordination is also increasing, which is apparent in 
vertical relationships between global retailing and food import companies and over-
seas suppliers. Most African fruit and vegetable exporters, for example, have ex-ante 
agreements with European importers before the start of the season. Some of these 
agreements are oral and do not include binding specifications in terms of prices or 
delivery dates. Yet, most large exporters increasingly engage in more binding con-
tracts with buyers, including a (minimum) price, quantity, and timing of delivery. 
Some exporting firms even receive pre-financing from their overseas partners. 
4 Small Farmer Participation in Value Chains 
The claims mentioned earlier in this chapter about the exclusion of small farms 
from value chains were based on limited empirical evidence. New empirical evi-
dence from a variety of countries shows a largely consistent and much more nu-
anced picture. The studies generally confirm the main hypotheses that transaction 
costs and investment constraints are a serious consideration in these chains, and 
that processing and retailing companies express a preference for working with 
relatively fewer, larger, and modern suppliers. However, empirical observations  
                                                          
input provisions, investment loan assistance, etc. In both the dairy and sugar sectors, the 
extent of supplier assistance by processors also goes considerably beyond some of the 
trade credit and input assistance provided by agribusiness to farms in some developing 
countries. In cotton, cotton gins typically contract farms to supply seed cotton and pro-
vides them with a variety of inputs. This model, which is common in Central Asia, resem-
bles that of the gin supply chain structure in developing countries, such as in Africa. 
However, the extent of contracting and supplier assistance seems to be more extensive in 
Central Asia, with credit, seeds, irrigation, fertilizer, etc., being provided by the gins. In 
fresh fruits and vegetables, the rapid growth of modern retail chains with high demands on 
quality and timeliness of delivery is changing the supply chains. New supplier contracting, 
which is developing rapidly as part of these retail investments, include farm assistance 
programs, which are more extensive than typically observed in Western markets. They re-
semble those in emerging economies, but appear more complex in several cases. Finally, 
in grains there is extensive and full vertical integration in Russia and Kazakhstan, where 
large agro-holdings and grain trading companies own several large grain farms in some of 
the best grain producing regions. 
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Table 1. Smallholder procurement in Sub-Saharan African export supply chains 
Country Commodity (group) Year of survey 






Ghana Fruits & vegetables   3,600 
 Pineapples 2006 45% 300–400 
 Papaya  2006 10–15%  
 Vegetables  2002 95%  
Cote d’lvoire Pineapples 1997 70%  
 Mango 2002 <30%  
 Banana 2002 100%  
Senegal French beans 2005 52% 600–900 
 Tomatoes 2006 0% 0 
Kenya Fresh fruit & vegetables 2002 ±50% 12,000–80,000 
Madagascar Fresh vegetables 2004 90-100% 9,000 
Zambia Vegetables 2003  300 
Zimbabwe Fruits & vegetables 1998 6% 10 
Source: Maertens et al. (2009) 
also show a very mixed picture of actual participation in value chains, with many 
more small farms being contracted than claimed initially. Table 1 summarizes this 
for a selection of countries. 
Hence, the recent literature shows that small farmers are indeed “excluded” in 
some value chains and in some countries, but that this is far from a general pat-
tern, and that small and poor farms are included in value chains to a much greater 
extent than expected ex-ante based on arguments of transaction costs and capacity 
constraints. 
Some studies show there is variation in the nature of contracts and value chain 
finance going to different farm structures. For example, in case studies of dairy 
processors, investment support for larger farms include leasing arrangements for 
on-farm equipment, while assistance programs for smaller dairy farms include in-
vestments in collection units with micro-refrigeration units (World Bank, 2005). 
Some studies find that within the “small farm” group it is the (relatively) richest 
and most educated that are included and that the poorest are being excluded 
(Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). However, even this is not an undisputed general 
conclusion. Other studies show that the poorest may be included, and some coun-
tries (e.g. China) even show that the “horticultural revolution” (associated with 
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simultaneous dramatic growth of modern retail investments and urban demand for 
horticultural products) is associated with a pro-poor bias in the supply chain 
(Wang et al., 2009). 
4.1 Small Farmer Inclusion and Governance 
An important aspect of the growth of modern value chains is the governance and 
industrial organization of these supply chains. In particular, as mentioned earlier, 
there is much evidence that vertical coordination is widespread in high value 
chains, often as an institutional response to overcome problems of local market 
imperfections. With investors and food companies facing important problems of 
sourcing high quality produce on the supply side and high consumer standards on 
the demand side, vertically coordinated systems have emerged to control standards 
by suppliers and to provide suppliers with inputs and management advise. Vertical 
coordination varies from integrated (large) farms managed by food companies to 
extensive contracting arrangements with smallholders. 
The rise of contracting, far from leading to the exclusion of poorer farmers, is 
shown to improve access to credit, technology, and quality inputs for poor, small 
farmers that heretofore were faced with binding liquidity and information con-
straints due to poorly developed input markets. Studies have found extensive evi-
dence of input provision through interlinked contracts – in the form of inputs, 
credit, bank loan assistance, technology, and management advice, etc. Minten et 
al. (2009) and Maertens and Swinnen (2009) find that due to increased vertical 
coordination in newly emerging value chains between buyers and poor, small 
farmers in African countries, such as Madagascar and Senegal, poor rural house-
holds experienced measurable gains from supplying high-standard horticulture 
commodities to global retail chains. 
However, this is not always the case. For example in China, Wang et al. (2009) 
found that while rising urban incomes and emergence of a relatively wealthy mid-
dle class were associated with an enormous rise in the demand for fruits and vege-
tables, almost all of the increased supply was being produced by small, relatively 
poor farmers that sell to small, relatively poor traders. Despite sharp shifts in the 
downstream segment of the food chain toward modern retailing (there has been a 
rapid increase in the share of food purchased by urban consumers in supermarkets, 
convenience stores, and restaurants), marketing and production are still organized 
by traditional methods. 
In general, a wide variety of models of value chain development have emerged, 
with variations both across countries and across sectors, reflecting different com-
modity and market characteristics, resource constraints, etc. For example, in parts 
of Africa where access to land is ample and easy, large-scale farms have been set 
up in some cases. In other cases, where land is already used by smallholders and 
land pressure is strong, contracting systems have been set up. Comparative advan-
tage of small versus large farming systems, associated with different types of 
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commodities – such as extensive grain growing versus intensive, high-quality 
vegetable production systems – have also led to different chain models. We will 
document and explain these changes and the models that have emerged in the final 
section of this chapter. 
5 Value Chain Finance6 
The provision of credit within state-controlled supply chains was widespread in 
the 1960s and 1970s. This was most extreme in the Communist system where pro-
duction at various stages and the exchange of outputs and inputs, including credit 
and finance, along the chain was coordinated and determined by the central com-
mand system (Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004). Also in other regions, government 
marketing organizations and parastatal processing companies often provided credit 
to their suppliers. The dominant form of state-controlled VCF was that of seasonal 
credit provisions to small farmers in return for supplies of primary produce (Poul-
ton et al., 1998). In fact, state-controlled VCF was often the only source of credit 
(and other inputs) for peasant farmers (IFAD, 2003). 
This system of state-controlled supply chains and VCF has undergone tremen-
dous changes during a period of reform in the 1980s and 1990s. In the transition 
world, the liberalization of exchange and prices, and the privatization of farms and 
enterprises caused major disruptions in the chain and in credit supply for farms 
(Swinnen and Gow, 1999). During the period of transition, many farms faced seri-
ous constraints in accessing finance. Also in many developing countries privatiza-
tion and market liberalization led to a sharp decline in the supply of credit and in-
puts to farms as it disrupted the working of various government-controlled agri-
cultural institutions, cooperative unions, and parastatal processing companies 
(IFAD, 2003). As government marketing boards and cooperatives have ceased to 
play a major role in the procurement of agricultural produce, so has the provision 
of credit through state-controlled VCF. In addition, market liberalization led to a 
decline in government (subsidized) credit to the agricultural sector. 
Following privatization and liberalization, new forms of VCF have emerged 
and are growing (Swinnen, 2007; World Bank, 2005). These are no longer state-
controlled but are introduced by private companies. Private traders, retailers, agri-
businesses, and food processing companies increasingly contract with farms and 
rural households to whom they provide credit and financial services in return for 
guaranteed and quality supplies. 
Farmers face financial constraints and constraints in accessing inputs because 
of imperfections in rural credit and input markets. Private contract-farming 
                                                          
6 See Miller and Jones (2010), van Empel (2010), Winn et al. (2009) for excellent recent 
reports on the importance of value-chain finance and reviews of different cases, models, 
and applications; and Kloeppinger-Todd, R. and M. Sharma (2010) for a review of in-
novations in rural and agricultural finance. 
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schemes are primarily set up by processors, traders, retailers, and input suppliers 
as a private institutional response to these constraints. 
Table 2, based on surveys, shows that for small cotton farmers in Kazakhstan 
access to credit is by far the most important reason to enter into contracts with cot-
ton gins. Similarly, for small vegetable farmers in Madagascar and Senegal, access 
to credit in the form of cash credit, as well as in the form of pre-financed inputs, is 
a very important motivation to sign contracts with exporters. 
Table 2. Motivations of small farmers to supply high-value chains 
a. Cotton farms in Kazachstan 
 Reasons for 
contracting (%) 
Most important  
reason (%) 
Guaranteed product sales 9 8 
Guaranteed price 4 3 
Access to credit 81 75 
Access to quality inputs 11 10 
Access to technical assistance 0 0 
Other 4 3 











Stable income 66 30  
Stable prices 19 45 15 
Higher income 17 15  
Higher prices   11 10 
Guaranteed sales  66 32 
Access to inputs & credit 60 63 44 
Access to new technologies 55 17 0 
Income during the lean period 72 37  
Source: Minten et al., 2009; Maertens et al., 2007; Swinnen, 2005 
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For VCF to function, the downstream company offering finance itself needs suffi-
cient funds and cash flow to finance an VCF system. Initiators of VCF programs 
often include foreign investors (who have access to more financial means because 
they have “deep pockets” or because they can access financial markets interna-
tionally), or companies who have financial resources from activities in other sec-
tors (and who are interested in investing these funds in the food sector, such as fi-
nancial-industrial groups in Russia), or domestic processors and traders who sell 
on the international market (and have thus sufficient financial liquidity, such as 
grain traders in Kazakhstan); or domestic processors who have links with the in-
ternational finance through VCF themselves (such as cotton gins in Central Asia 
who receive pre-financing through contracts with international cotton traders) 
(World Bank, 2005). 
6 Models of Private Sector VCF 
Different models of private-sector VCF exist. Sometimes different models of VCF 
develop because processors themselves do not have access to finance. For exam-
ple, in the Ukrainian oilseed sector in the 1990s, farms preferred to sell oilseeds to 
trading firms through barter contracts against inputs, such as agricultural machin-
ery and fuel oil, rather than to crushers. Because processors (crushers) had poor 
access to credit, traders, equipment suppliers, and even banks procured seeds for 
the oilseed crushing factories. Many farms also retained ownership of their prod-
uct, leaving the crushing plants in their role of subcontractors, who charged a toll-
ing fee for processing seeds. In 1999, around 80 percent of the crushers through-
put of sunflower seeds was based on a tolling basis. Under the tolling system, 
crushers received 13 to 20 percent of the oilseeds delivered to them as their toll 
payment for crushing. The oil obtained from the rest was returned to the owners 
(equipment suppliers, farmers, traders), who sold the oil either in the domestic 
market (competing with the crushers) or exported it (EBRD/FAO, 2002). 
Alternatively, if domestic sources of finance are lacking, with tradable com-
modities foreign traders may provide the necessary finance for the whole chain. 
For example, in the Kazak cotton chain forward contracting between domestic 
processors (cotton gins) and international cotton traders provided the gins with fi-
nancial means to pre-finance the farms’ inputs (Sadler, 2005).7 Hence the gins re-
ceived themselves VCF from the international traders that they then used to fi-
nance their own VCF schemes with cotton farms. However, more generally, one 
can distinguish several “classes” of VCF. 
                                                          
7 The resulting ownership structure is the opposite to that in the United States or Austra-
lia, as the Central Asian farms, mostly small farms that have limited access to finance, 
sell the cotton to gins while in the United States and Australia farms maintain owner-
ship of the cotton throughout the chain, and gins are paid as service providers. 
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6.1 Trade Credit 
In its most simple form, VCF comes down to credit supplied by traders and mid-
dlemen. Trade credit usually involves short-term seasonal loans, in cash or in-
kind, generally between agricultural producers and produce buyers (or input sup-
pliers). These type of trade-credit relations often do not involve a purchasing 
agreement and the farmer is free to sell his produce to other buyers as long as he 
can pay off his debt. However, crops are used as collateral and in case of default 
the trader/middlemen cashes in on the standing or harvested crops as loan repay-
ment. The provision of credit through middlemen and small traders is mostly in-
formal, and often based on social and personalized trade relations. 
6.2 Interlinked Contract-Farming 
The dominant type of VCF is that of contract-farming, in which the provision of 
credit is linked to a purchasing agreement for agricultural produce. This was also 
the dominant type of state-controlled VCF: seasonal credit and input provisions to 
farmers by (para)-state processing units and government marketing boards in re-
turn for supplies of primary produce. 
Also, private-sector VCF mostly includes the provision of cash credit or agri-
cultural inputs directly to farmers for which payment is accounted for at the time 
of delivery of the product. These basic forms of VCF have been studied in the de-
velopment literature on interlinked market transactions8 and have been described 
as transactions in which credit and output markets are interlinked (e.g. Bardhan, 
1989; Bell and Srinivasan, 1989). They are also the essence of various outgrower 
schemes, which are widely documented (see e.g. Table 1). 
However, much more complex forms of contract-farming and VCF are emerg-
ing. Apart from transactions in credit and output markets, contract-farming in-
creasingly also includes the provision of extension services, technical and manage-
rial assistance, quality control, transport, and specialized storage services to farmers. 
Moreover, several food companies, such as in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, provide medium-term investment loans, investment assistance programs, 
and machinery procurement systems to farmers (Dries et al., 2009). 
                                                          
8 Bell and Srinivasan (1989) define interlinked market transactions as a transaction in 
which the parties trade in at least two markets on the conditions that the terms of all 
trade between them are jointly determined. Interlinked market transactions always in-
clude an element of credit as they involve exchange of current for future claims. Apart 
from interlinked credit and output transactions, interlinked transactions also exists in 
land markets (landlord who provide tenants working capital) and in labor market (em-
ployers who give advances to laborers in return for a claim on their labor in peak labor 
demand periods). 
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6.3 Loan Guarantee Programs 
Triangular structures were used by processors and retailers in Eastern Europe to 
draw on in financial institutions, resources, and administrative capacities. Exam-
ples of this are processor or retailers who provide loan guarantees to financial in-
stitutions for loans to their suppliers (farmers). The underwriting is for specific 
loans, related to the contract, and restricted for contracting suppliers. Loan guaran-
tee programs within triangular contracting structures were implemented, for ex-
ample, by sugar processors in Slovakia (Gow et al., 2000), by retailers in Croatia 
for fruit and vegetable supplier investments in greenhouses and irrigation 
(Reardon et al., 2003), and by dairy processors in several countries (Dries and 
Swinnen, 2004). 
6.4 Special Purpose Vehicles 
An even more complex form of indirect VCF, where both input suppliers and 
processors are included, is the use of so-called “special purpose vehicles (SPVs)”. 
A SPV is a stand-alone company jointly owned, for example, by the processor, 
input providers, and a bank. The contract between the SPV and the farms can in-
clude provisions on output, inputs, and credit. 
An important advantage of such institutions is that the partners in the SPV now 
share the risk of contract breach. When a processing company by itself imple-
ments input and investment facilitation programs, the processor carries the entire 
risk of farms’ breaching contracts, although both the input suppliers and the finan-
cial institutions benefit from these contract innovations. Institutions such as SPVs 
allow the sharing of risk between various agents, and hence will stimulate invest-
ments by companies who otherwise may be deterred by the risk.9 
Another example of a triangular structure with a specially designed institution 
is the collaboration between the Russian dairy processor Wimm Bill Dann (WBD) 
and the Swedish dairy equipment seller DeLaval to sell milking equipment to Rus-
sian dairy farms through leasing contracts. The program allowed financially con-
strained dairy farms to lease milking equipment. The farms paid off by delivering 
the raw milk to one of the dairy processors owned by WBD (World Bank, 2005).10 
                                                          
9 In some cases such structures have developed with farmer participation. For example, 
Gow and Swinnen (2001) report that in eastern Hungary a group of sheep farmers set up a 
producers’ co-operative through which they participated in a SPV-like joint company. 
10 One example of this was implemented by an international financial institution special-
ized in agribusiness and food supply chain financing in Hungary, in collaboration with 
local agribusiness partners (Gow and Swinnen, 2001). See also van Empel (2010). 
Finance Through Food and Commodity Value Chains in a Globalized Economy 59 
 
6.5 Warehouse Receipt Finance 11 
Warehouse receipt payments is another form of indirect VCF in which safe and 
secure warehouses issue warehouse receipts to depositors of commodities and al-
low financial institutions to use the deposited inventory as safe, dependable, and 
liquid collateral. This is an indirect form of VCF in which producers can use de-
posits at a warehouse as collateral for a loan.12 Such a system is most common for 
grains and other non-perishable products.13 
7 Importance of VCF 
White and Gorton (2004), Dries et al. (2009), and Swinnen (2006) find that the 
introduction of VCF programs by agribusiness companies is a common phenome-
non across transition countries. 
Also in Latin America, VCF through credit and input provision in contract-
farming schemes is widespread over many different agricultural sectors such as 
fruits and vegetables sector, poultry, tobacco, sugarcane, barley, and rice (Dirven, 
1996). Similarly, at least in some value chains in India, VCF is quite common. Gu-
lati et al. (2007) point out, with evidence from several South and Southeast Asian 
countries and from several sectors that smallholder and poor farmers participate in 
and benefit from contract-farming schemes and VCF systems in food supply chains 
in Asia. In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), private VCF has become a dominant system 
of rural financing. For example, in Mozambique and Zambia it is virtually the only 
source of finance for agricultural households (IFAD, 2003). It is estimated that for 
SSA as a whole, 50 percent of rural households that access credit do so from whole-
salers, retailers, and processors in the form of VCF. (DFID, 2004). According to 
IFAD (2003), the VCF in Sub-Sahara Africa is mostly direct VCF in the form of 
seasonal credit and input provision in contract-farming schemes; and is most com-
mon in traditional, tropical export sectors (coffee, tea, cocoa, rubber, oil palm) and 
in high-value, non-traditional export sectors (horticulture)14. 
In summary, in many countries and sectors VCF is becoming more important 
than pure credit transactions in traditional commercial and informal lending. 
                                                          
11 See Höllinger et al. (2009) for a review of warehouse receipt finance in transition coun-
tries. 
12 Warehouse receipts systems have also been set up, for example in the Kenyan maize 
market in 2007 but remain very limited there (Collins, 2009). 
13 Warehouse receipt systems have proven to be a successful instrument in providing fi-
nance in the value chains for source countries, in particular for storable commodities 
such as grains, in transition countries (World Bank, 2005). 
14 For example, in Mozambique 270,000 and 100,000 smallholders respectively receive 
input credit from cotton and tobacco companies in contract-farming systems (IFAD, 
2003). 
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Maertens et al. (2007) have analyzed the importance of VCF for smallholder hor-
ticulture households in Senegal and find that farmers who contract with exporting 
companies receive on average about 300,000 FCFA seasonal credit from the com-
panies, mostly in the form of inputs, while on average farm-households can access 
only about 130,000 FCFA of credit a year from other formal and informal sources. 
8 Impact of VCF on Productivity, Quality and Output 
Empirically, the impact of private VCF systems on productivity is difficult to 
quantify as several other factors affect output simultaneously and as company-
level information is difficult to obtain. Still, whatever evidence is available sug-
gests that successful private VCF has important positive effects, both direct and 
indirect. 
Case studies indicate that private VCF programs can lead to strong growth in 
output, quality, and productivity. For example, case studies of the sugar and dairy 
sectors in Eastern Europe show how VCF caused output, yields, and investments 
to grow dramatically (Gow et al., 2000; Swinnen, 2006). In the case of Polish 
dairy farms, VCF induced an increase in farm investments (in particular cooling 
tanks and better cows) in the mid-1990s. As a result the market share of the high-
est quality milk increased from less than 30 percent on average in 1996 to around 
80 percent on average in 2001 (Dries and Swinnen, 2004). 
VCF has indirect spill-over effects as households’ overall access to capital in-
creases and their risk reduces. VCF also implies guaranteed sales, often at guaran-
teed prices, which reduces marketing risk for farmers. Coordinating firms also 
share in the production risk of farmers through ex-ante provision of inputs and 
credit. Moreover, credit arrangements and prompt cash payments after harvest in 
VCF programs improves farmer’s cash flow and access to capital, with spillover 
effects on other household activities, including other crops. Reduced risks, im-
proved income stability, and access to capital are particularly important effects in 
the case of capital and insurance market imperfections. 
A number of empirical studies provide evidence for these household spillover 
effects. Henson (2004) shows that contracted vegetable farmers in Uganda benefit 
from reduced risk and improved access to credit. Another illustrative example 
comes from Minten et al. (2009) on the vegetable sector in Madagascar. A large 
number of very small farms benefit from vegetable contract farming through more 
stable incomes, shorter periods without revenue, and technology and productivity 
spillovers on rice. Studies examining the motivations of farmers to engage in con-
tract-production with VCF show that access to inputs, credit, and guaranteed sales 
prices, are the most important motivations, not direct income effects (see table 2). 
If the processing firm can set the terms of the VCF contract such that it captures 
the rents, the productivity growth may not benefit the farms (Bardhan, 1989); and 
interlinking may even bestow additional monopoly power upon the processing 
company, which may exploit unequal power relationships with farmers to extract 
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rents from the chain. While empirical evidence on this issue is limited, and very 
few studies have actually tried to measure this, what is available suggests that 
farmers do share importantly in the benefits of VCF. For example, studies on the 
horticultural export sector in Africa (Madagascar by Minten et al. (2009), and in 
Senegal by Maertens and Swinnen (2009), and Maertens et al. (2011)) find that 
there are strong poverty reduction effects from vertical coordination and VCF in 
high-value supply chains. 
9 Policy Issues 
There are a variety of policy issues related to VCF and development. They can be 
classified in several groups: the enabling environment for the emergence of VCF; 
addressing rent distributional and efficiency concerns of VCF; and implications of 
VCF for public interventions in agriculture and agri-business development. 
First, it is important to emphasize a general policy implication, which is to rec-
ognize the potential importance of VCF and, therefore, the need to explicitly inte-
grate this into policy thinking and program strategies. One of the key findings of 
this review is that VCF is more widespread than generally recognized, albeit with 
significant variation across countries and sectors. Hence there is no one-size-fits-
all VCF but instead several models of VCF, reflecting commodity characteristics, 
and stages of transition and development. There is no one-size-fits-all policy. In-
stead optimal policies and policy components will also need to differ and change 
to reflect these differences. 
Second, policy implications are necessary for a good investment climate and 
the reduction of policy uncertainty, which is the primary concern of firms in de-
veloping countries. A poor policy environment has a negative effect on invest-
ments in the supply chain and on the beneficial effects of VCF programs. 
Third, macro-economic stability is a key condition not only for the investments 
but, even more so, for various forms of chain-based finance. Since VCF is a finan-
cial activity, significant instability may cause such changes in the contract condi-
tions that self-enforcement is no longer possible. Hence, macro-economic stability 
is not only necessary for more traditional finance systems but also for VCF.  
Fourth, an important issue is the role of competition, both for efficiency and 
equity. Competition induces processors, retailers, and input suppliers to provide 
VCF and it constrains rent extraction of suppliers by up- or downstream compa-
nies (Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2010). Given these strong benefits of competition 
for farms in the chain, ensuring competition is an important role for the govern-
ment. Competition can be enforced through both domestic policies (competition 
policies, lower barriers of entry) as well as external policies (liberal trade poli-
cies). The importance of competition does not only apply to private companies, 
but holds also for the case when the government is directly or indirectly imposing 
a monopoly system and thereby extracting rents from farms. However, it should 
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also be pointed out that some have argued that too much competition may be det-
rimental to VCF as it can undermine enforcement (Poulton et al., 1998). 
Fifth, related to the competition issue, it remains important to encourage alter-
natives in credit markets. Empowering farmers in VCF relations with companies 
will come importantly from alternative options in accessing credit. The existence 
of alternative channels of credit or inputs will constrain rent extraction in the sup-
ply chains – and is good in general. Therefore, the existence of VCF does not nec-
essarily diminish the importance of investments in alternative sources of farm fi-
nance, like bank credit to farmers, or leasing 
Sixth, another area where governments can play an important role is invest-
ments in institutions to assist farms with credit contract negotiations and dispute 
settlements. As it is generally either not possible or too costly to resolve disputes 
in courts, alternative dispute settlement institutions can play an important role. 
Measures to increase the transparency of VCF contracts, to support alternative 
dispute settling arrangements, provide market benchmarks for price negotiations, 
training farmers in their rights/obligations as contractors, etc., are all important to 
increase the transparency of the VCF system, competition among systems, and 
thereby the bargaining position of farms. 
Finally, governments (and development agencies) should look into supporting 
innovative finance instruments. A key conclusion is that the most successful VCF 
approaches have addressed specific constraints, are flexible, and allow adjust-
ments to reflect changes in the environment. Some innovative instruments using 
chain-based financing are mostly private initiatives and there is only a limited role 
for the government. In other cases there may be a more important role, for exam-
ple the regulatory and legal system, which is required for these instruments to 
function; or there may be a role in co-financing seed money to start up some of 
these innovations. The key conclusion is being open to innovations that explicitly 
take into account the value chain as a structural aspect of the financing problem. 
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